Contact information:
: jr2009@georgetown.edu
Address: 37th St NW & O St NW
ICC Building, Office 556
Washington, DC · 20057 · USA
Scholar · IDEAS · · ·
About
I am an Assistant Professor of Economics at Georgetown
University since 2023. Before joining Georgetown, I was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the King Center on Global
Development at Stanford University from 2022 to
2023.
This paper provides the first systematic empirical examination of bureaucratic nepotism and anti-nepotism
legislation in
an entire modern bureaucracy. By linking confidential information on family ties and administrative
employer-employee
records for the universe of civil servants in Colombia, I uncover three sets of empirical findings.
First, using a novel
methodology of family network reconstruction, I provide evidence on the pervasiveness of close family
connections in the
public administration and demonstrate its negative relationship with the performance of public sector agencies.
Second,
by further exploiting within-bureaucrat variation in family connections generated by the turnover of top
non-elected bureaucrats, I show that family connections to public sector managers and advisors distort
the allocation and compensation of workers at lower levels of the hierarchy. Connected bureaucrats receive
higher
salaries
and are more likely to be hierarchically promoted but are negatively selected in terms of public sector
experience,
education, and records of misconduct. Third, I evaluate an anti-nepotism legislation reform by exploiting a
sharp
discontinuity in the set of family connections restricted by this law. I prove the limited effectiveness of this
reform
and show how bureaucrats strategically responded to this policy change by substituting margins of favoritism and
reshuffling posts within the public administration.
Do political donations distort the allocation of public procurement contracts? By linking the universe of public
contractors and the mandatory report of political donations by individuals and firms in Colombia, our reduced
form results demonstrate a long-term distortion in the contract allocation process attributable to political
donations: (1) Contractors who donate to political campaigns are more likely to be awarded contracts, often of
greater value, than those who do not. (2) These donor contractors tend to continue receiving public contracts
even after losing direct political connections in subsequent election cycles, suggesting that their donations
grant them extended access beyond immediate reciprocation. (3) Pointing to potential inefficiencies, we find
that contracts secured by donor contractors frequently exceed budgetary limits and tend to benefit riskier firms
and inexperienced individuals. Building on these results, we conduct a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) in
collaboration with investigative journalists, NGOs, and the Office of the Inspector General in Colombia to study
how new mayors respond to deterrence messages about contract scrutiny for their donors. Using this intervention,
we estimate a structural model to rationalize the reduced form results and evaluate counterfactual policies
aimed at reducing the influence of political contributions on procurement outcomes.
The extent to which authoritarian regimes use coercive, relative to redistributive, strategies
to manage social dissent exhibit significant variation across the territory they govern. We
argue that the incidence of different authoritarian tactics to deal with dissent depends on
the coercive capacity of the state, which autocrats often inherit from the past. Where
autocrats facing increasing discontent can rely on their capacity to coerce regime dissidents,
they are more likely to eschew redistributive strategies. In contrast, dissent increases the
likelihood of redistribution where autocrats lack readily-available tools for coercion. We
provide empirical support for this argument primarily using a difference-in-differences
identification strategy that exploits three sources of variation. First, we use a land reform
that between 1910 and 1992 redistributed more than 50% of Mexico's agricultural land. Second,
we exploit a wave of dissent around the 1960s. Finally, we use municipal data on the
availability of loyal semi-formal militias to coerce dissidents. Our results indicate that,
when confronted with dissent, the PRI regime redistributed relatively less land in
municipalities with more rural militia presence. We also show that, in those municipalities,
events expressing social discontent were more successfully deterred. The study sheds light on
how state coercive capacity shapes authoritarian strategies.
• "Decolonizing the State: Evidence from the Tanzanian Civil Service, 1956-76"
with Jeremy Bowles Abstract · Draft
How did decolonization shape the state? Using novel data on the universe of middle and senior-level civil
servants in Tanzania, both prior to its independence and for a decade subsequently, we study how state-building
investments in the bureaucracy were affected by political independence in 1961. First, we establish major
increases in the scale of the bureaucracy. Leveraging spatial variation in socioeconomic conditions inherited at
independence, in a difference-in-differences design we find that the initial post-independence years coincide
with the \textit{de facto} centralization of the bureaucracy in more urban, wealthier areas, before a gradual
expansion to more rural areas. Second, we provide some evidence that the relationship between bureaucratic
inputs and policy outputs gradually weakens over time. Third, we suggest that reductions in bureaucratic
effectiveness were more likely driven by the increasing politicization of the bureaucracy than by changes in the
composition and human capital of its agents.
• "Digging for Votes: Electoral effects of disclosing illegal mining in Colombia"
with Santiago
Saavedra Abstract · Draft
What are the electoral consequences of providing local governments with state capacity-enhancing technologies to
detect illegal activities? Governments worldwide struggle to monitor illicit practices, especially when creating
distributional tensions within communities. Some individuals may benefit economically from these activities,
while others suffer from their negative externalities. How this divide ultimately affects political outcomes
remains uncertain, but hinges on whether most community members benefit from illegal practices or primarily bear
their costs. To combat the rise of illegal mining, and as a part of an RCT, national and local authorities in
Colombia received machine-learning predictions of illegal mine locations. We found that this intervention
reduced illegal mining activities and significantly impacted political accountability: It increased voting
concentration and generated a shift in support toward non-incumbent parties. Our findings align with a theory
suggesting that both the proximity to disclosed illegal activities and their intensity influence the extent of
electoral responses. Overall, our research highlights the transformative role of technology-driven state
interventions in reshaping political behavior and reinforcing democratic accountability, especially in areas
with weak state capacity.
In this paper, we empirically investigate whether insider-initiated corporate philanthropy aligns with Milton
Friedman's hypothesis that the primary social responsibility of business is to increase profits. Drawing on
detailed data on corporate giving patterns and leadership characteristics, we examine how philanthropic
activities change when key insiders (e.g., CEOs) transition, and whether these donations are driven by personal
motives or by broader profit-maximizing strategies. By comparing the behavior of insider-led corporations to reasonable benchmarks—and by exploring any shifts in giving patterns following executive turnover—we
shed light on the extent to which charitable contributions serve shareholder value or reflect personal agendas.
Further, we consider the role of family and associated foundations, analyzing whether insiders leverage
corporate philanthropy for social or professional networking. Our findings speak directly to Friedman's claim:
are these philanthropic decisions primarily strategic, supporting corporate reputation, employee engagement, and
long-term profitability, or do they persist in ways that cannot be easily explained by profit maximization?
Through a rigorous empirical assessment, we aim to deepen our understanding of the motivations behind corporate
giving and provide new insights into the conditions under which corporate philanthropy either corroborates or
challenges Friedman's influential perspective.
Publications
• "Collateral Damage: The Legacy of the Secret War in Laos"
with Felipe Valencia Caicedo The Economic Journal, 134(661) 2101-2140, The Royal Economic Society and Oxford
University Press, 2024.
Abstract · Paper · Journal · Appendix
As part of its Cold War counterinsurgency operations in Southeast Asia, the US government conducted a
"Secret War" in Laos from 1964-1973. This war constituted one of the most intense bombing campaigns in human
history. As
a result, Laos is now severely contaminated with UXO (Unexploded Ordnance) and remains one of the poorest
countries in
the world. In this paper, we document the negative long-term impact of conflict on Laotian economic development,
using highly disaggregated and newly available grid-cell data on bombing campaigns, satellite imagery, and
development outcomes. We find that bombings have a negative, significant and economically meaningful impact on
nighttime
lights, expenditures and poverty rates. Almost 50 years after the conflict officially ended, bombed regions are
poorer and growing at slower rates than unbombed areas. A one standard deviation increase in the total pounds of
bombs
dropped is associated with a 33% decrease in nightlights. To tackle the potential endogeneity of bombing, we use
as
instruments the distance to the Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh Trail as well as to US military airbases outside Laos
established
before the conflict started. Using census data at the village and individual levels, we show the deleterious
impact
of bombing and UXOs in terms of health, education, structural transformation, and rural-urban migration.
This survey article reviews the literature on the multifaceted consequences of historical conflict. We revisit
three
key topics, which are especially relevant for the current Ukrainian context. 1) The negative long-term impact of
bombing campaigns and political repression against civilians. 2) The interplay between forced migration,
refugees and
conflict. 3) The role of gender and war, with a special focus on sex ratios and conflict-related sexual
violence. We
conclude with an empirical investigation of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict, including historical
determinants
such as ethnic populations, historical political repression and voting outcomes.
• "Media, Secret Ballot and the Process of Democratization in the United States"
with Leopoldo Fergusson
& BK Song Journal of Historical Political Economy, 3(3), 391-425. Now Publ., 2023 Abstract · Paper · Journal · Appendix
Can the media determine the success or failure of institutional reforms? We study the adoption
of secret voting in the US and the role of media in this arguably crucial step to improve
democracy. Using a difference-in-difference identification strategy and a rich dataset on
local newspapers, we find that areas with high levels of media penetration exhibited multiple
improvements in democratization outcomes following the adoption of the electoral reform.
Specifically, the press contributed to the decrease in partisan attachment and support for
dominant parties. It undermined the unintended consequence of the manipulation of electoral
boundaries and the fall in turnout. We consider multiple concerns about our identification
strategy and address the potential endogeneity of newspapers using an instrumental variable
approach that exploits the introduction of wood-pulp paper technology, and woodland coverage
at the county level in 1880. Exploring the heterogeneous effects of our results, we argue that
the media mattered through the distribution of information to voters, and the increase of
public awareness about political misconduct.
• "Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a land allocation program in Mexico"
with Leopoldo Fergusson &
Horacio Larreguy The Economic Journal, 132(648), 2815-2834. The Royal Economic Society and Oxford
University Press, 2022.
Abstract
· Paper · Journal · Appendix
How can clientelism impose restrictions on bureaucratic state capacity? We develop a model of the politics of
state capacity building undertaken by incumbent
parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods
provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents
have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for
the model's implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) that affected local state capacity across Mexican municipalities and over time. Our
difference-in-differences and instrumental variable identification strategies exploit a
national shock that threatened the Mexican government's hegemony in the early 1960s. The
intensity of this shock, which varied across municipalities, was partly explained by severe
droughts that occurred during the 1950s.
• "Conflict, Educational Attainment, and Structural Transformation: Evidence from La Violencia in
Colombia"
with Leopoldo Fergusson &
Ana Maria Ibañez, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 69(1), 335-371. The University of Chicago
Press, 2020.
Abstract
·
Paper · Journal · Appendix
We examine the long-term impact of violence on educational attainment, with evidence from Colombia's La
Violencia. Individuals exposed to violence during, and especially before, their schooling years experience
a significant and economically meaningful decrease in years of schooling. This impact has consequences
beyond human capital accumulation: exposed cohorts engage in activities with less human capital content.
Violence thus influenced aggregate development - particularly the process of structural transformation, in
which some sectors gain prominence as income increases. The effects result not so much from the direct
destruction of physical infrastructure, but from affected households' responses to the hardships of
conflict.
Tax evasion lies at the core of the relationship between citizens and the state: it reflects the level of
trust in the state and compliance with society's implicit `social contract'. However, empirically
analyzing it is challenging, with few direct and reliable measures. This has hampered the advancement of
the theoretical and empirical literature, which is especially underdeveloped in the case of indirect tax
evasion. We conduct list experiments on a large sample of households to estimate the incidence of
value-added tax (VAT) evasion, as well as the extent of social desirability bias in respondent answers.
Around 20% of respondents engage in evasion and, surprisingly, they are not ashamed to recognize this
openly. Evasion is more prevalent in places with more informality and less physical presence of the state,
as well as among poorer, less educated individuals, and those who disregard the rule of law.
• "I Sell My Vote, and So What? Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates of Clientelism in Colombia"
with Leopoldo Fergusson &
Carlos Molina, Economía Journal, 19(1), 181-218. Brookings Institution Press, 2018.
Abstract ·
Paper · Journal · Appendix
Exchanging one's vote for particularistic benefits—practices usually grouped under clientelism—is often
thought to weaken programmatic links between citizens and politicians and disincentivize public good
provision, as well as undermine voter autonomy and the ideal role of elections. However, empirically
analyzing this key phenomenon for the working of democracies entails formidable challenges. We conduct
list experiments on a large sample of households to estimate the incidence of clientelistic vote buying,
as well as the extent to which respondents refrain from openly recognizing this behavior. Nearly one out
of every five respondents engage in clientelism, and, surprisingly, they do not feel ashamed to admit it.
Guided by the existing literature and systematically verifying the sensitivity of the results to model
specification, we examine the robust correlates of clientelism and discuss the implications of our key
findings.
Projects currently on hold
• "The Roots of Violence and Racism in the US: Historical Lynchings and Today's Police Brutality"
with Thorsten Rogall Abstract
What explains the prevalence of police brutality against the black minority in the US? This paper shows that
historical lynchings are strongly associated with today's police violence. To this end, we combine historical
county-level data on the number of blacks lynched in the Deep South with recent geolocated micro-level data on
fatal police violence. In terms of magnitudes, lynchings can account for about 10 percent of all police
violence. The
relationship is robust to various controls, passes several placebo checks, and confirmed using an instrumental
variables strategy. In terms of mechanisms, lynchings created a persistent culture of both violence and racism.
In particular, the effects are especially strong in counties that continuously experienced lynchings, as opposed
to
those where all lynchings were concentrated in one event. Furthermore, newspaper circulation is a strong enabler
of
persistence and in-migration (especially of young men) mutes the effects. We also rule out typical alternative
explanations.
• "Low Entrepreneurial Intent: A Legacy of South Africa's Mining Monopsony"
with Neil Lloyd Abstract
This project investigates the hypothesis that the low levels of self-employment and informal sector activity
in contemporary South Africa can be linked to the legacy of labour recruitment in South Africa's gold mining
industry. At the outset of the Witwatersrand gold rush (1886) labour was largely sourced from outside of South
Africa: Southern Mozambique, Botswana, even China. However, during the early 1900's a series of events
culminated in the
expansion of recruitment to African men within South Africa. These events included the collapse of the
Witwatersrand
Native Labour Association (WNLA) as a centralized recruitment agency, the decision by the Transvaal government
to
repatriate around 30,000 Chinese workers, and a recession in the Cape province which led the governor to
encourage recruiters
to expand their operations to the Cape's `native reserves'. We combine historical recruitment data with
contemporary,
geo-coded survey data to estimate the long run impact of the centralized mining recruitment on contemporary
self-employment. Our research design exploits the historical borders of districts selected for recruitment, as
well as the
historical location of private sector recruiters prior to the re-establishment of a monopsony in 1918.
